Thursday, June 2, 2022

USA GUN CONTROL DEBATE #2

 USA  GUN  CONTROL  DEBATE  -  A  WELL  REGULATED  MILITIA  -  The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America


by  Professor  Saul  Cornell

CHAPTER ONE

ENGLISH TYRANNY VERSUS AMERICAN LIBERTY

BEARING ARMS IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA



In June of 1768 John Hancock's schooner Liberty returned to Boston from the Portuguese port of Madeira with its cargo hold laden with wine. Crown officials were eager to make an example of Hancock, whose penchant for smuggling was well known. After inspectors confirmed their suspicions that the appropriate duties had not been paid, customs officials seized the ship. Making an example of the Liberty proved to be a grievous error in judgment. "The popularity of her owner, the name of the sloop," and a "general aversion" to customs officials and "parliamentary taxation" worked to "inflame the minds of the' people." Hancock was a particularly poor choice to single out for prosecution since he was also an influential member of Bostons branch of the "Sons of Liberty" the group that had sprung up in cities and towns across America during the Stamp Act tax protests three years earlier. An angry crowd soon assembled on Hancock's wharf to protest the seizure. Wielding "clubs, stones and brickbats," Hancock's supporters attacked the revenue officers and drove them from the scene. As word of the Liberty Riot spread throughout the town, large crowds began assembling, and by evening more than a thousand Bostonians had taken to the streets. An angry crowd attacked the homes of crown officials and forced them to seek refuge aboard a Royal Navy vessel anchored in the harbor. Incensed by Boston s defiance and lawlessness, the royal governor, Frances Bernard, requested that British troops be dispatched to the town to restore order. Americans now faced the nightmarish prospect of a standing army garrisoned in their midst, enforcing the dictates of a distant government with little concern for their liberties.1


The Liberty Riot was a decisive turning point in American relations with Britain. Samuel Adams, an outspoken champion of American rights and another prominent Son of Liberty, urged Bostonians to "behave like men" and "take up arms immediately and be free." Adams was hardly the only Bostonian to suggest this course of action. Governor Bernard reported that the mob had been harangued by leaders who declared, "We will support our Liberties, depending upon the strength of our own Arms." The use of a standing army without the legislature's consent was a dear violation of British constitutional principles. Such an unconstitutional use of force could have no legal sanction and might legitimately be met with force of arms. Adams and others did not claim to be asserting novel arguments, but rather based their opposition to British policy on well-established English legal principles.2


The legal and constitutional arguments made by Adams gained additional force from history itself. The Bostonians who took to the streets to protest the seizure of the Liberty were steeped in the lessons of the past, the struggles of the Roman Republic and the more recent battles between English Whigs, the champions of Parliamentary power, and Tories, the supporters of Royal prerogative. History was not simply a subject consigned to the pages of leather-bound volumes detailing the events of bygone days. Americans looked to the past for guidance. An impressive parade of essays signed with the names of historical figures appeared in the press to offer comments on contemporary politics, forging a close link between past and present. Essays signed "Brutus," a hero of the Roman Republic, or "Algernon Sidney," a more recent hero from seventeenth-century English history, filled the pages of newspapers. The use of pseudonyms shielded writers from reprisals and allowed them to affirm their kinship with a host of heroic figures who personified liberty and virtue. Among the favorite pen names adopted by Samuel Adams during this troubled time was "Vindex," a provincial Roman statesman who had opposed the tyranny of the corrupt monarch Nero and denounced the decadence of Imperial Rome. Once again, it was time for virtuous citizens, the modern heirs of Vindex, to step forward to oppose tyranny. One Boston almanac placed an image of Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government on its cover. For those readers unfamiliar with this work, the publisher noted that Sidney was a noble martyr to English liberty who had been beheaded during the Reign of Charles II." Described as the personification of virtue, a man in whom "the spirit of the ancient Republics revived," Sidney's influential treatise became an important political textbook for Americans of Adams's generation. It affirmed a principle that would become the cornerstone of American thinking about the relationship between liberty and arms. "In a popular or mixed government," Sidney wrote, "the body of the people is the public defence, and every man is armed and disciplined." When Adams and other Bostonians urged citizens to take up arms to defend their liberty against British tyranny, they did so with a confidence derived from their belief that America had taken Sidney's maxim to heart. In America, the body of the people were armed and well organized.3


While Bostonians debated the appropriate course of action to take in response to British policy, the town's selectmen issued an order that their public arms be cleaned and placed on display in the town hall. Governor Bernard viewed the gesture as deliberately provocative, and he informed the Crown that the muskets were placed on view "to remind the People of the Use of them." Despite this assertive gesture, Bostonians had not yet abandoned all hope of seeking a peaceful resolution to their disagreement with the Crown. The town meeting petitioned the governor, stating the colonists' grievances and asserting their understanding of their rights as English subjects. The petition was deemed sufficiently important that copies were printed as a broadside and widely distributed. Colonists asserted three interrelated constitutional principles grounded in their own views of British law. First, a standing army garrisoned among the people without their consent was inconsistent with liberty. Second, colonists had a right to "have Arms for their Defenses." To support these two legal claims they invoked the authority of the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, one of the most influential statements of English constitutional principles. The Declaration of Rights declared that "the subjects being Protestants may have arms for their defense." Bostonians put their own distinctive gloss on this English idea, framing it in strongly collective terms by noting that it was a legal principle that "was "well adapted for the necessary Defense of the Community." Finally, colonists anchored their claims by referring to their colony's militia law, describing it as a "wholesome law of the Province" that required each householder to provide himself with a musket to meet his obligation to participate in the militia. Citizens of Massachusetts had done more than simply invoke Sidney's injunction about the necessity of an armed citizenry; they had written its underlying principle into their own laws.4


If a standing army symbolized tyranny, a citizens' militia was its antithesis, embodying virtue and liberty. The response of Massachusetts to British policy was decisive and included a call for a colony-wide convention to assemble to discuss the crisis. Towns across the province readily complied with this request. In addition to sending representatives to the convention, individual towns readied their militia for action. Indeed, one week after the Boston town meeting's petition was published, the Boston Gazette reported that selectmen in a neighboring town had ordered that a sufficient store of gunpowder be acquired to equip the local militia. The colonel of the local militia in that town "has declared his intention to order a strict Enquiry into the state of his Regiment, respecting Arms, Ammunition, &c." Colonists who bore arms did not act as isolated individuals, but rather acted collectively for the common defense, and did so within a clear set of legal structures established by colonial and British law.5


It would be impossible to overstate the militia's centrality to the lives of American colonists. For Americans living on the edge of the British Empire, in an age without police forces, the militia was essential for the preservation of public order and also protected Americans against external threats. One contemporary writer observed that for New Englanders the "near neighbourhood of the Indians and French quickly taught them the necessity of having a well regulated militia." The militia served an important social role as well. Musters were occasions for friends and neighbors to come together to drill and celebrate. Before the development of modern political parties, the militia was one of the central means for organizing citizens. When American colonists spoke about the importance of a well-regulated militia, they were not simply reciting a tired political cliche lifted from the pages of an esteemed political treatise; they defended an institution that was central to their way of life.6


THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AS A CIVIC OBLIGATION


Given the centrality of the militia to the everyday lives of the colonists, one can appreciate their horror when they discovered that the British intended not only to foist an oppressive standing army upon them, but also to disarm the colony's militia. Rumors of British treachery spread quickly. A writer for the Boston Gazette reported that the royal governor intended to punish Americans in a fashion "more grievous to the People, than any Thing hitherto made known." The governor's plan included three components:


1st that the inhabitants of this Province are to be disarmed. 2d. The Province  to be governed by Martial Law. 3d. A number of Gentlemen who have  exerted themselves in the Cause of their Country, are to be seized and sent to  Great Britain.7


On September 28, 1768, two days after the publication of these dire warnings, two regiments of British troops landed in Boston. To prevent colonists from making good on their threats to mobilize their militia, British officials banned the importation of military stores, including gunpowder, and issued orders compelling Boston s citizens to turn in their arms. Americans were outraged and refused to comply with the demand that they disarm.


One of the most incisive attacks on British policy was authored by Samuel Adams. Adams reiterated a point made by the Boston town meeting in its petition that British citizens had a right to maintain arms for their own defense. To support this legal interpretation he quoted the eminent English jurist, Sir William Blackstone, the leading authority on English law. Adams offered the following gloss on Blackstone's interpretation of the English Declaration of Rights: "Having arms for their defense he [Blackstone] tells us is 'a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.'" This ancient right was not exercised by individuals acting unilaterally or in isolation, but rather required that citizens act together in concert as part of a well-regulated militia. Without legal authority- a group of armed citizens acting on their own was little more than a riotous mob.8


In defending their right to have arms, Bostonians were acting in strict accordance with the colony's own militia law. "It is certainly beyond human art and sophistry," Adams confidently asserted, "to prove that British subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights, and, who live in a province where the law requires them to be equip'd with arms, 8Cc. are guilty of an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law directs." The decision to arm themselves was not an assertion of a new right, but the exercise of an ancient one. The colonists' actions were in accordance with 'well-established English constitutional principles and were sanctioned by their own militia law. Colonists recognized that the evil they encountered in British policy had a clear political purpose: to sap the colonists' capacity for political resistance.9


The right that Adams and Bostonians asserted was described by Blackstone as the "5th auxiliary right" of British subjects, a set of "outworks or barriers" within the British constitutional system that functioned as political safeguards against tyranny. When he described the right as a means of preventing "the violence of oppression" and likened it to other political safeguards such as the right of assembly Blackstone captured the essentially political nature of this right. Although the right was held by subjects, it was not analogous to other individual rights such as conscience. The right to have arms was linked to a particular civic purpose. It was analogous to the right to petition, another political safeguard protecting English liberty against arbitrary power. The fifth auxiliary right, the right of subjects to have arms, served a public political function and was aimed to prevent the violence of oppression, a term that underscored the right's role as political safeguard.10


Blackstone's fifth auxiliary right was legally distinct from the individual right of personal self-defense, and the two were treated separately in his influential legal treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England. The former was a political right embodied in the English Declaration of Rights and was clearly linked to a particular civic purpose. The latter was one of the many natural rights that had slowly evolved under common law, the body of cases that English courts had adjudicated over the course of several centuries and that contained the bulk of English legal doctrine. Most important natural rights, including the right of self-defense, had been modified by the common law. Thus, once men left the .state of nature and entered civil society, they renounced the untrammelled right of self-defense. "The law requires," Blackstone declared, "that the person who kills another in his own defense, should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of the assault, before he turns upon his assailant." Flight, not armed confrontation, was the legal obligation of English subjects when faced with a threat to personal safety. Indeed, Black-stone contrasted the obligation to stand and fight incumbent upon subjects in time of war, which would have included militiamen bearing arms, with the legal requirement enjoining civilians to retreat to the wall before responding with deadly force to an attack. Another important legal distinction between these two rights related to the power of the state: government could compel individuals to bear arms for public defense but could not force individuals to arm themselves for personal defense.11


The constellation of ideas defended by Adams and the Boston town meeting included a set of principles that "would come to play a central role in early American constitutional law: an opposition to standing armies and a belief in an obligation to bear arms for the common defense in a well-regulated militia. While there was broad agreement on the importance of these interrelated principles, no single legal model emerged on how to protect them in the first constitutions drafted by Americans. While every state had militia statutes describing the obligation to serve in the militia, the majority of state constitutions drafted during the Revolutionary era omitted any discussion of the right to bear arms. Indeed, the first state constitutions were much more likely to include a prohibition on standing armies than to affirm such a right. Virginia, for example, did not explicitly protect the right to bear arms but included a provision asserting the need for a well-regulated militia. The first state to include such a right was Pennsylvania in its Declaration of Rights, which affirmed that "the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state." Finally, Massachusetts became the first state to protect a right to both "keep and bear arms." In addition to fusing the right to keep and bear arms into a single constitutional principle, the Massachusetts Constitution linked this ideal to an obligation to provide "for the common defense."12


In all of these first constitutional documents the right to bear arms was as much a civic obligation as it was a claim against government interference. While today's Americans treat rights as strong claims of citizens against government interference, Adams and his contemporaries believed rights were inextricably bound up with legal obligations. This characteristic of eighteenth-century rights was elaborated by Blackstone when he wrote that "the rights of persons that are commanded to be observed by the municipal law are of two sorts; first, such as are due from every citizen, which are usually called civil duties; and, secondly such as belong to him, which is the more popular acceptation of rights." The learned English jurist then went on to note that allegiance and protection were "reciprocally, the rights as well as the duties of each other." Citizens had both a right and an obligation to arm themselves so that they might participate in a militia.13


The clearest example of how different the civic obligation to bear arms was from basic individual rights such as freedom of conscience may be found in the conflict that emerged between these two ideas in the first state constitutions. Quakers and other religious groups committed to pacifism lobbied hard to obtain exemptions from the obligation to bear arms. The state could compel citizens to bear arms, and Quakers sought an explicit constitutional protection not to be forced to bear arms. The problem of religious exemptions also provides another illustration of how different the right to bear arms for the common defense was from the common law of individual self-defense. The state could not force an individual citizen to defend himself; they could force the people to bear arms in defense of the state. Exemptions for conscientious objectors only made sense in the context of the state's right to compel citizens to bear arms for public. defense against external threats or internal enemies. None of the early state constitutions adopted language protecting an individual right to keep or carry arms for personal self-defense. Efforts were made to protect such a right in both Virginia and Massachusetts, but in the end neither state chose to adopt an explicit statement protecting the right of self-defense. It would take another four decades before any state would explicitly affirm such a right. The right of individual self-defense would remain a matter of common law, not constitutional law.14


THE DEBATE OVER BEARING ARMS

IN THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS:

DEFINING A CIVIC RIGHT


The chief architect of Virginia's declaration of rights was George Mason, a wealthy Virginia planter who was one of the largest slaveholders in the state. Contemporaries described him as the modern embodiment of Roman virtue. A leading advocate for colonial independence, Mason also became an outspoken champion of the militia, urging his fellow citizens to enact a law to put the colony's militia in a state of readiness for possible war with Britain. Mason s vision of the militia reflected his own patrician values and the traditional Whig ideas of Sidney and others who praised the militia ideal and believed that social stability required that an armed citizenry be led by "gentlemen of the first fortune and character." Mason s preference for this traditional Whig conception was evident in the following resolve he drafted on January 17,1775, for the Fairfax County Committee of Safety, an important institution responsible for coordinating the colony's military efforts.15


Resolved, That this Committee do concur in opinion with the Provincial  Committee of the Province of Maryland, that a well regulated Militia,  composed of gentlemen freeholders, and other freemen, is the natural  strength and only stable security of a free Government. 


Mason's emphasis on the need for the militia to be composed of property holders reflected a view common among members of Virginia's gentry elite that it was dangerous to arm the "rabble." Without the guidance of gentlemen, an armed population might easily become a mob, not a well-regulated militia.16


Mason took a leading role in drafting Virginia's declaration of rights, and his efforts reflected ideas he had developed in his earliest public writings about the need for a well-regulated militia. Edmund Randolph, another influential figure in Virginia politics, remarked that Masons proposal "swallowed up all the rest, by fixing the grounds and plan, which after great discussion and correction, were finally ratified." Masons first draft did provoke some controversy among Virginians because it affirmed "that all Men are born equally free and independent." Some members of the Virginia convention opposed such language, fearing that it might undermine the institution of slavery and incite slaves to rebel. Edmund Randolph recollected that such objections were easily satisfied by reminding delegates that "with arms in our hands, asserting the general rights of man, we ought not to be too nice and too much restricted in the declaration of them." The connection between the militia and the slave patrols that protected Virginians against the threat of slave insurrections was well understood by Mason and others. Although the committee followed Mason s language closely, the affirmation of the need for a well-regulated militia departed from his earlier statements in one important respect. It abandoned any reference to a militia composed or officered by gentlemen. The final language adopted by Virginia asserted that the militia was "composed of the body of the people."17


When the committee charged with producing the declaration of rights revised Mason s original draft, they settled on the following language:


That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to  arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing  armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and  that, in all cases, the,military should be under strict subordination to, and  governed by, the civil power.18


Not all Virginians were satisfied with Masons militia-focused language. Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the most forward-looking and innovative legal thinker involved with the framing of the Virginia Constitution, wished to include an expansive statement of the right to keep arms. Jefferson s formulation would have severed the connection between such a right and any obligation to bear them in a well-regulated militia. An admirer of the Italian Enlightenment theorist Cesare Beccaria, Jefferson endorsed Beccaria's observation that laws prohibiting individuals from carrying firearms only worked to the benefit of criminals. In essence, Beccaria was the first modern theorist to argue that when firearms are outlawed, only outlaws will have firearms. Jefferson copied Beccaria's discussion of this matter into his legal commonplace book in a section dealing with government policy. In an alternative constitutional proposal that Jefferson circulated among members of the convention, he sought the inclusion of a provision protecting a more robust individual right to keep and carry firearms outside of the context of the militia. Had Jefferson succeeded, the Virginia Declaration of Rights would have asserted that no free man shall be debarred the use of arms." This language proved too bold for his contemporaries, and Jefferson quickly emended his draft language to narrow the scope of this right, effectively eliminating the right to carry arms. The revised proposal suggested that the Virginia Declaration of Rights include language asserting that "no free man shall be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements]." This modified Beccarian model affirmed an individual right to keep arms for private purposes. Yet neither the expansive Beccarian model nor the more limited modified model of keeping arms was ultimately included in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. The convention chose instead to retain Mason's formulation of this right, which focused on a well-regulated militia.19


Virginia's constitution was crafted by members of a planter elite who were often compared to the great leaders of the Roman republic, men such as Brutus or Cato. Pennsylvania's constitution, by contrast, owed far more to plebeian ideas than to patrician ones. The colony was often described by contemporaries as the '"best poor man's country," and its constitution was framed by men of humble origins who spoke on behalf of the laboring classes and the industrious middling sorts, such as tradesmen and small farmers. One prominent group who took a leading role in crafting the Pennsylvania Constitution hailed from the western part of the state. These men were animated by long-standing grievances against the eastern Quaker elite who had dominated the legislature for most of the colonial period. For more than a decade prior to American independence, backcountry Pennsylvanians pressed for a militia law to help them protect their communities against threats from Indians along the frontier. The Quaker-dominated assembly rebuffed these appeals, preferring to negotiate, not fight, with the Native population. The most notorious incident in this decade-long struggle was the Paxton Boys' Uprising, the massacre of a group of defenseless Conestoga Indians by backcountry Pennsylvanians in 1763. "The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers" framed their grievances against the Pennsylvania government in the following terms:


When we applied to the Government for Relief, the far greater part of our  Assembly were Quakers, some of whom made light of our Sufferings 8c  plead Conscience, so that they could neither take Arms in Defense of  themselves or their Country, nor form a Militia law to oblige the Inhabitants  to arm.20


The text of the Paxton apology anticipated the language eventually included by Pennsylvanians in their Declaration of Rights, which asserted that the people had a right to '"bear arms in defense of themselves and the state." There is no evidence from the pre-Revolutionary era that Pennsylvanians were concerned about threats to the common-law right of individual self-defense. The Quaker-dominated legislature had not disarmed backcountry inhabitants, nor had it passed laws that prevented them from defending their homes against intruders. What the assembly had refused to do was enact a militia law or provide arms for frontier communities to mount a concerted collective defense, including retaliatory raids on Indian communities. The language eventually incorporated into the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights reflected this bitter struggle over public safety, and had little to do with public concern over an individual right to keep arms for self-protection.21


Although they had dominated colonial politics for much of the previous century, Quaker influence was on the decline by the onset of the American Revolution. Many Quakers opposed independence, a choice that further weakened their position. Although the Quakers' influence in Pennsylvania politics was greatly diminished, they were able to obtain one important concession from the framers of the state constitution. As religious pacifists opposed to bearing arms, Quakers won a religious exemption that would allow them not to bear arms:


That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment  of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his  proportion towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal  service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But no part of a mans  property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his  own consent, or that of his legal representatives: Nor can any man who is  conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if  he will pay-such equivalent: Nor are the people bound by any laws, but such  as they have in like manner assented to, for their common good.22


By including a right to bear arms and a right not to be forced to bear arms, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights struck a compromise position between the opposing demands of the backcountry residents and the Quakers.

Only after asserting the civic obligation to bear arms did the constitution then affirm:


That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and  the state; and as standing armies in the time of peace, are dangerous to  liberty, they ought not to be kept up: And that the military should be kept  under strict subordination, to, and governed by, the civil power.


As was invariably true in most Revolutionary-era constitutions, the right to bear arms was also set against the danger posed by standing armies, a juxtaposition that only underscored the military civic character of the right.23


While the right to bear arms was articulated as a civic right inextricably linked to the civic obligation to bear arms for public defense, the constitution did deal with the private use of arms in one other context. The Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly protected the right to hunt in a separate provision from the right to bear arms. In contrast to England, where game laws made hunting the exclusive province of the wealthy, in Pennsylvania "the inhabitants of this state shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; and in like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private property." The formulation of this right implied a right of government regulation, since hunting might be limited as to time, place, and manner. Still, protecting the right of all citizens to hunt made clear an opposition to the kinds of restrictions that the English game laws had codified and that had been used to effectively disarm a significant portion of the English population.24

The Massachusetts Constitution maintained the emphasis on collective defense found in the Virginia and Pennsylvania declarations of rights, but it added one crucial new word:


The People have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.  And as in time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be  maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power  shall always be held in exact subordination to the civil authority and be  governed by it. (emphasis added)25


The convention s inclusion of the word keep built on an assumption implicit in the state's militia statute that most citizens, apart from the poor, 'would provide their own weapons for militia duty and would therefore keep those weapons in their homes.26 In contrast to Jefferson s alternative formulation of the right to keep arms, which did not link this right to bearing arms, Massachusetts forged a tight link between the two. A single constitutional principle emerged, linking the right to keep arms with the obligation to bear them for the common defense.


One of most remarkable features of the framing and ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution was the decision to submit the draft constitution to towns for comments. The towns5 responses to the various provisions of the constitution provides a rare glimpse into popular constitutional ideas in the Founding era, including arms bearing. Although individual towns produced dozens of detailed responses to the proposed constitution and identified many flaws in the new frame of government, the clause on the right to keep and bear arms did not prompt extensive commentary. Only two western towns expressed any reservations about the wording: Both towns sought something closer to Jefferson s modified Beccarian model, which would have severed the connection between the right to keep arms and the obligation to bear them for the common defense.


A response from the town of Northampton suggested that "the people have a right to keep and bear arms as well for their own as the common defense."27 Williamsburgh, another town in western Hampshire County, echoed these protests:


1st. that we esteem it an essential privilege to keep Arms in our houses for  Our Own Defense and while we Continue honest and Lawfull Subjects of  Government we Ought Never to be deprived of them.


Reas. 2 That the legislature in some future period may Confine all the fire  Arms to some public Magazine and thereby deprive the people of the  benefit of the use of them.28


Williamsburgh sought an explicit statement of a right to keep arms for personal defense.29


The fear that the state might insist on the collective storage of arms had been voiced two years earlier when the state rejected the first proposed constitution. These apprehensions demonstrated how American thinking about the right to bear arms was powerfully influenced by a fear of British-style disarmament of the militia. The march of British Regulars on Concord to seize colonial military stores in 1775 left an indelible imprint on citizens of the commonwealth. Backcountry residents were especially anxious about ceding too much power to a distant government. For those who feared centralization of power, the state government in Boston was as much to be feared as the government of King George III had been during the Revolution. All governments were liable to become corrupt and oppressive if citizens failed to watch them with a jealous eye. Although as a practical matter Williamsburgh probably had little to fear about the dangers of centralized storage of weapons, the possibility was not completely beyond the pale. The state enjoyed enormous powers to regulate its internal police and enact laws consistent with the common good. In military matters the state's power was even greater since it could seize weapons or compel military service. It was precisely because they recognized the enormous power of the state's authority over firearms that Williamsburgh town residents sought to affirm a right to keep and bear arms in more expansive terms. Despite their protests, no other town in the commonwealth followed their lead, and the language included in the Massachusetts Constitution remained unchanged.30


A WELL-REGULATED RIGHT


The meaning of the Massachusetts Constitutions provision on keeping and bearing arms was clearly understood by contemporaries to provide explicit constitutional protection for weapons associated with militia service. The status of weapons with no connection to the militia posed a different set of issues. The scope of the right to keep or carry arms outside of the militia prompted a fascinating newspaper exchange less than a decade after Massachusetts towns had debated the merits of their constitution. One writer, adopting the Roman persona of Senex, argued that constitutional protection for the right to bear arms was limited by the purpose of the provision, which was to provide for the common defense. Following a well-established principle of legal construction and constitutional interpretation that would have been easily understood by Americans, Senex reminded his audience that in "defining this article, we ought to consider the evil intended to be remedied." In Senex's view, the right to bear arms was included in the Massachusetts Constitution as a means of preventing the disarmament of the militia. As Senex noted, "The idea, that Great Britain meant to take away their arms, was in the minds of the people." Another writer, who cloaked himself in a more popular literary style, adopting the less pompous name of Scribble-Scrabble, conceded "the people's right to keep and bear arms for a particular purpose is secured to them against any future acts of the legislature." As far as the personal right to use arms was concerned, "the legislature have a power to control it in all cases, except the one mentioned in the bill of rights, whenever they shall think the good of the whole require it." Until the legislature acted, either to regulate or prohibit the particular use of firearms, the people retained the right to use firearms for any lawful purpose. Asserting a basic principle of common law, Scribble-Scrabble informed his readers that "the other purposes for which they might have been used in a state of nature, being a natural right, and not surrendered by the constitution, the people still enjoy and must continue to do so till the legislature shall think fit to interdict." Senex and Scribble-Scrabble's interpretations of the Massachusetts Constitution were consistent with the fears expressed by Williamsburgh and Northhampton residents less than a decade earlier. While militia weapons owned for the purposes of meeting a specific legal obligation were constitutionally protected, other weapons were not. Although the scope of legislative authority over non-military weapons was considerable, it was certainly not unlimited. Laws enacted regarding firearms had to serve a legitimate public purpose and have a rational basis. Within those constraints the state was free to enact any type of regulation the legislature deemed necessary to promote public safety31


The right of the people to govern themselves and legislate their "internal police" was a bedrock principle of American constitutionalism. Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights made this explicit when it asserted that "the people of this State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same." While many in modern America have come to view regulation as somehow antithetical to liberty this was not how Americans in the
Revolutionary era viewed the matter. The ideal that Americans venerated was not the unrestrained liberty of the state of nature, but the ideal of well-regulated liberty. As one contemporary noted, "Well regulated liberty of individuals is the natural offspring of laws, which prudentially regulate the rights of whole communities." By contrast, "all liberty which is not regulated by law, is a delusive phantom." Outside of a well-regulated society governed by the rule of law, liberty was nothing more than licentiousness and anarchy32

The lengthy militia statutes enacted by the individual colonies and then revised by the states after they gained independence constituted the largest body of law dealing with firearms. These regulations could be quite intrusive, allowing government not only to keep track of who had firearms, but also requiring citizens to report to muster or face stiff penalties. The individual colonies used their broad police powers to regulate the non-military use of firearms in a variety of ways.


Regulations governing the storage of gunpowder were among the most common. States also prohibited the use of firearms on certain occasions and in certain locations. A good example of the breadth of the state's police powers is provided by a regulation forbidding Boston residents from storing loaded firearms in any domestic dwelling. The 1786 statute, 'An act in addition to the several Acts already made for the prudent Storage of Gun Powder within the Town of Boston," empowered the towns fire wardens to confiscate weapons and impose stiff fines for violating this law.33


The state also retained the right to disarm groups deemed to be dangerous. While the state could not pass English-style game laws that unilaterally disarmed the entire population, it could use loyalty oaths and enact discriminatory legislation to disarm particular groups in society that posed a risk to public safety. Although the language of Pennsylvania's constitutional provision on arms bearing was among the most expansive, the state also adopted one of the most stringent loyalty oaths. The Test Acts, as they were known to contemporaries, barred citizens who refused the oath from holding public office and serving on juries. These individuals were also to be disarmed, as "persons disaffected to the liberty and independence of this state."34 The acts thus stripped many but not all the essential rights of citizenship from a large segment of the population, perhaps as much as 40 percent of the citizenry. Individuals who failed to take the oath could still publish, assemble, and seek petition for redress of grievances, but they "were not full participants in the civic life of their state. Their status fell somewhere between full citizens and resident aliens. Although loyalty oaths were enacted in other states, the Pennsylvania Test Acts were not repealed until long after the treaty of Paris was signed in 1783 and formal hostilities with Britain ended. The oaths did more than address the special situation faced by the state during wartime; they reflected a more fundamental belief that citizenship was tied to a set of legal obligations and demanded a certain level of public virtue. One other type of systematic disarmament policy "was common. Laws disarming groups such as slaves, freed blacks, Indians, and those of mixed-race ancestry were common. Thus, Pennsylvania prohibited "any Negro" to "carry any Guns, Sword, Pistol, Fowling-Piece, Clubs, or other Arms or Weapons whatsoever" without "his Master's special Licence." Since blacks were ineligible to bear arms, the prohibition was phrased as a limit on carrying weapons.35


The legal difference between laws regulating civilian gun use and laws pertaining to bearing arms was an important one. The state enjoyed far greater authority over the former type of activity. A good illustration of this principle may be found in a bill introduced by the young James Madison during his time as a legislator in Virginia. In a "Bill for the Preservation of Deer," Madison proposed a stiff penalty for individuals who hunted out of season. The most interesting features of this law penalized persons who "shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty." The language of this provision provides a remarkable window into the way Madison understood the differences between bearing a gun for personal use and for the common defense. The state clearly retained the right to regulate the use of firearms and differentiated between the level of restrictions that might be placed on bearing a gun and bearing arms.36


Even in the absence of any legislation regulating the right to keep or carry firearms, there were a variety of constraints embedded in the common law. The common law also provided some modest protection for a right to keep or carry firearms for personal protection. The nature of the common law made it particularly well suited to deal with the complex problem of regulating firearm use. The genius of the common law was that it was an organic entity capable of evolution and growth. The meaning of self-defense was an excellent illustration of this dimension of the common law. The natural right of self-defense had evolved slowly into the more limited right embodied in the common law. These changes reflected the accumulated wisdom of countless judges who had struggled with the difficult task of balancing the right of self-defense with the need to protect public safety37


The right to travel armed was severely constrained under common law. The author of English Liberties, of the Free-born Subject's Inheritance, a popular English legal text reprinted in the colonies, defined an affray as a crime against the king's peace and that "constables may take away the Arms of them who ride or go armed in Terror of the People." Another influential legal text, The Conductor Generalis, the Office, Duty, and Authority of Justices of the Peace, noted that "in some case there may be an affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people." Under British law armed travel was regulated, and mere possession of arms likely to provoke a public panic was also punishable. Popular guides to the law published after the Revolution continued to devote considerable space to the subject of affrays. The nature of the common law provided considerable flexibility in deciding exactly what constituted an affray. Context was crucial to making these kinds of determinations. In America, where legal restrictions on hunting were far more lax and gun ownership more common, the crime of affray was more narrowly defined than in England. A party of men hunting in season in Pennsylvania would not under most circumstances have been viewed as committing an affray, while an armed assembly riding into town might well be viewed as such and could be legally disarmed by a justice of the peace.38


SHAYS'S REBELLION


While the framers of America's first constitutions struggled to craft documents that preserved the ideals of well-regulated liberty, there were those who felt that the new state governments were themselves potential threats to liberty. In the period between the 1760s and 1780s, popular protest movements emerged in backcountry regions of North and South Carolina. As one contemporary observed, the protestors described themselves as "Regulators" because they attempted "to regulate the administration of justice in the remote settlements." Regulator movements were an expression of a species of popular constitutionalism in which the people took direct action themselves and thus bypassed the courts or the legislature. Perhaps the most dramatic action of Regulators was the closing of courts to protect debtors from creditors. The notion that the people might assemble in arms and defend their liberty posed a potential challenge to the new state governments' authority. During the Revolution, popular assemblies, including mobs, had played an important role in the movement for independence. During the Liberty Riot in 1768, citizens invoked a right of constitutional resistance. In 1786, embattled farmers in western Massachusetts sounded an alarm and mustered, asserting their right to take up arms to defend their liberty against the tyranny of a distant government that seemed unresponsive to their needs. This time that distant government was not far across the sea, but sitting in Boston. The very same logic that led Samuel Adams to invoke the fifth auxiliary right in the aftermath of the Liberty Riot was used by farmers in western Massachusetts to challenge their own state government's authority. Shays's Rebellion, the largest violent uprising in the new nations history, would become the first test of the radical potential of the militia and the right to bear arms in post-Revolutionary America.39


The western farmers' grievances were serious. Funding the war against Britain had placed a severe strain on the American economy. The individual states adopted different strategies to deal with the burden of war debt. Massachusetts adopted a tight fiscal policy, including high taxes. Farmers in the western part of the state were particularly hard-hit by these policies. As the number of farm foreclosures rose, and popular frustration mounted, events took a dramatic turn when a contingent of Revolutionary War veterans mustered themselves and marched in military array on the town of Northampton to shut down the local courts and prevent further foreclosures. Although the protestors did not have the legal authority to act as a state-sanctioned militia, their behavior imitated the rituals and organization of the militia. The insurgents, many of them armed with muskets, marched behind a fife and drum and assembled in the center of town. The judges of the court, dressed in formal judicial attire—long black robes and gray wigs—were prevented from entering the courthouse by the assembled protestors. The men who marched on the courthouse in western Massachusetts did not call themselves rebels or insurgents, but Regulators. As had been true for earlier Regulator movements in the Carolinas, the Shaysites cast themselves as champions of the "good of the commonwealth" and framed their protests in a distinctly collective idiom, invoking the metaphor of the "Body of the People." Shays and his followers claimed to be exercising "the first principles of natural self preservation." Thus, in choosing to arm themselves, the Shaysites did not invoke the right to bear arms protected by their state constitution; instead they claimed a natural right that superceded any written constitutional text. The voice of the people spoke not through written constitutional texts, but directly through popular assemblies, including the militia.40


The Regulators who took up arms against the government of Massachusetts went to extraordinary lengths to dispel the idea that they were a mob. Their actions and rhetoric self-consciously drew on symbols associated with the Revolutionary militia. Citizens were urged to emulate the minutemen and "turn out at a minute's notice." Regulators organized themselves into regiments and kept track of participants on muster rolls. The goal stated by these Regulator units was to suppress the "tyrannical government in the Massachusetts State." Regulators acted as if they were simply carrying forward the heritage of the Revolution and even adopted the practice of adorning their hats with green boughs, a symbolic gesture that had been used on ceremonial occasions by troops during the Revolutionary struggle.41


Proponents of Regulation denied that they intended to "subvert all Government, and throw all things into a State of Anarchy and confusion." The governor of the commonwealth, James Bowdoin, saw matters differently. In a proclamation condemning the actions of the Northampton insurgents, he asserted that their behavior was "fraught with the most fatal and pernicious consequences" and "must tend to subvert all law and government." In short, Bowdoin denounced the rebellion for undermining the security provided by a "well-regulated society" and threatening life, liberty, and property.42


A few days after the events in Northampton, another crowd of farmers closed the courts in Worcester. This time Governor Bowdoin took decisive action and called out the militia. Rather than follow the orders of the governor and disperse the insurgents, however, a large number of the town's militia refused to march against the protestors. Some members of the militia even joined ranks with the rebels they had been sent to quell. A similar scenario played out in Great Barrington. Once again the government dispatched the militia to liberate the court from the mob. When the militia met up with the Regulators, a member of the crowd suggested putting the matter to a vote: supporters of opening the court stood to one side of the road while those opposed crossed the highway. Nearly eight hundred of the thousand militia members who had been sent to protect the courts voted with their feet to join the rebels and keep the courts closed.43


For Shays and his supporters, the actions of those citizens who had refused to take up arms against the Regulators were a living proof of the superiority of a citizens' militia over a standing army. In contrast to professional soldiers, who would have had few scruples about opening fire on an assembly of citizens, a militia composed of the body of the people would never be party to such an act. For the Friends of Order, the supporters of government authority, the refusal of the western militia to muster against the Regulators only confirmned the weakness and inadequacy of the militia as a bulwark against anarchy. Shays's rebellion exposed a tension in American constitutional theory: was the militia an agent of government authority, or was it a popular institution that might serve as a check on government? The notion that the militia might effectively nullify an unjust law by refusing to enforce it, or in extreme situations actually take up arms against the government, were two of the most radical ideas to emerge out of the intellectual ferment of the Revolutionary era. Both of these ideas had been put into practice during Shays's Rebellion.44


Regulators defended their actions in a language that reflected a strong corporate sensibility that was itself rooted in their desire to defend their local communities against outside threat. Men did not act alone as isolated individuals, but acted in concert with one another as a public body In the view of the Shaysite Luke Day, the Regulators were literally "the body of the people assembled in arms." Shays and his followers were not radical individualists, but strongly communitarian and localist in their outlook. For backcountry radicals such as the Regulators, the militia was an expression of the locality, not a creature of the state.45


Opponents of the rebellion, Friends of Order, attacked the Regulators as insurgents, 'levellers," "bandetti," or simply "the mob." In their view, American Independence had banished the right of armed resistance against constitutional government. As one Congregational minister from western Massachusetts noted, "Our government is so constituted that publick oppressions may be soon removed without force, either by remonstrance against the measures of rulers, or by a change of the rulers themselves." The right of revolution was a natural right that individuals ceded as a prerequisite for creating political society. The only justification for taking up arms was when "rulers usurp a power oppressive to the people, and continue to support It by military force in contempt of every respectful remonstrance." Shaysites enjoyed representation and had access to the courts. Indeed, their decision to close the courts only underscored their lawlessness. Rebellion against duly constituted authority demanded a forceful response by government. "If a part of the people attempt by arms to controul or subvert the government, the rulers, who are the guardians of the constitution, have a right to call in the aid of the people to protect it." Even Samuel Adams, the firebrand of the Revolution, denounced the Regulation. In a situation in which representative institutions and courts of law were functioning, the rule of law, not arms, was the primary guarantee of life, liberty, and property.46


When the Continental Congress learned of unrest in Massachusetts, including the refusal of western militia units to quell the rebellion, they used the pretext of raising troops to combat Indians in the Northwest Territory as the justification for raising additional troops to aid Massachusetts. Eventually the state raised an army, turning to Boston s business community to underwrite the effort. The prospect of an army marching westward prompted the Regulators to make a bold decision: they moved to seize the federal arsenal at Springfield. When word of the Regulators' plan reached Boston, troops headed west to Springfield to cut them off and defend the arsenal. The better-equipped troops loyal to the government' easily routed the Regulators, and the movement collapsed.47


The leaders of the movement, Daniel Shays and Eli Parsons, fled the state. The government of Massachusetts passed the Disqualification Act and required Shaysites to take a new oath of allegiance. Those who refused to take the oath were denied the right to serve on juries, hold public office, or vote. The law also disarmed individuals. While the Disqualification Act prevented Regulators from serving on juries or possessing firearms, they were not-stripped of all their rights. The state clearly distinguished between rights associated with citizenship, civic rights such as participation in juries and bearing arms, and rights that were genuinely individual in character such as freedom of conscience or "the liberty of the press."48


In the view of Massachusetts poet, playwright, and historian Mercy Otis Warren, "the turbulent spirit" in western Massachusetts "awakened all to a full view of the necessity of concert and union in measures that might preserve their internal peace." The Boston merchant Stephen Higginson commented, "I never saw so great a change in the public mind on any occasion as has lately appeared in this state as to the expediency of increasing the powers of Congress." Beyond the borders of Massachusetts similar responses were articulated by a variety of leading political figures. No one was more shaken by the events than General George Washington. When news of the uprising reached him at Mount Vernon, he fired off letters to several of his former Continental Army aides and inquired about the "cause of all these commotions." Was the rebellion the outgrowth of "licentiousness," or ~was it instigated by "British-influence disseminated by the Tories," or was it possible that this tumult sprang from some "real grievances"? Washington's alarm reflected a genuine sense of fear about America's future. History taught that all republics were fragile and could be destroyed by popular licentiousness as well as by conspiracies hatched by corrupt leaders. To steer a course between the threats of anarchy and tyranny was no easy matter. Decisive action was necessary to avert the contagion from spreading. In a letter to Henry Knox, Washington worried that "there are combustibles in every state, which a spark might set fire to."49


While in general there was little support for the rebels among the nation's elite, there was one notable exception, Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to his friend James Madison, Jefferson offered his own assessment of the "the late troubles" in Massachusetts. "I hold it," Jefferson wrote, that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing." Jefferson's response to Shays's Rebellion, like his rejected proposal on the right to keep arms, demonstrated again that on most constitutional matters he stood well outside the mainstream in Revolutionary America. Yet, his ideas about an individual right to have arms tapped into a strain in American constitutional thought that would gain strength, not (diminish, in the coming decades.50


Despite the quick collapse of Shays's Rebellion, the Regulator movement did have an important impact on American constitutional development. It provided additional impetus for a growing movement to reform the Articles of Confederation, America's first constitution. Delegates from each of the states were dispatched to Philadelphia to attend a constitutional convention. The problem of military reform would be critical to their deliberations. Providing some means to coordinate the individual state militias under a centralized authority was deemed essential to protect the nation from internal and external threats. The problem was how to accomplish this goal without undermining the power of the states and alarming a population that was still fearful of standing armies and devoted to the idea of state control of the militia.

…………………


TO  BE  CONTINUED

AMERICA - GUNS - SECOND CONSTITUTION #1

THE TRUTH IS THOSE WHO QUOTE THE SECOND POINT OF THE CONSTITUTION TO HAVE ALL AND ANY KIND OF GUN, DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT.

YOU NEED TO READ THIS BOOK BEFORE YOU THINK YOU KNOW THIS SECTION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.

EVEN POLITICIANS AND PRESIDENTS DO NOT KNOW WHAT THIS BOOK BRINGS TO LIGHT.

Keith Hunt 


AMERICA  -  GUNS  -  SECOND  CONSTITUTION


Praise for

A Well-Regulated Militia:


The Founding Fathers and the Origin

of Gun Control in America

"This intelligent, carefully rendered history of gun policy in the United States ... is challenging but essential reading for scholars, specialized undergraduates, and readers interested in law, criminal justice, and public affairs."

—Library Journal


"If proof were still needed that the study of the Second Amendment remains a fruitful source of inquiry, Saul Cornell's new book provides it. Crisply written and vigorously argued, A Well-Regulated Militia advances an often hackneyed debate by looking beyond the original concerns of the Revolutionary era. Cornell concisely demonstrates why so many of the contemporary fictions swirling around the meaning of this vexed clause depart from its real history."

—-Jack Rakove, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Original Meanings


"Saul Cornell provides a wonderful, original treatment of a much discussed subject. Based on a meticulous review of American history, Cornell shows that both sides of the debate over the Second Amendment are mistaken. This is a must-read."

—Erwin Chemerinsky, Duke University School of Law


"Jettisoning the rancorous partisanship and historical distortions of both advocates and opponents of gun control, Cornell recovers the lost civic dimension of the constitutional right to bear arms. The point of departure for any future, historically informed discussion of this most controversial amendment, A Well-Regulated Militia clears the way for fresh and constructive thinking about the rights/and responsibilities of gun ownership in America today." —Peter S. Onuf, author of Jefferson's Empire: The Language of American Nationhood


'A provocative alternative in the debate over the historical meaning of the Second Amendment. Anyone interested in how the right to bear arms was thought about in the early republic will need to take this book into account."

—Keith E. Whittington, author of Constitutional Interpretation




A  WELL  REGULATE  MILITIA


The Founding Fathers and the Origins of gun Control in America 


 by  SAUL   CORNELL




PREFACE


Writing the history of a topic as divisive and emotionally charged as the Second Amendment and gun control has posed a number of unique challenges. If I had set out to write a historical justification of gun control or a defense of gun rights, I would have certainly written a different book and done so in far less time. In contrast to advocates engaged in promoting a particular agenda, historians have an obligation to place such agendas temporarily aside while they pursue their research. In the course of researching this project and writing this book, I had to jettison many of the assumptions I had originally brought to this study. The history of the Second Amendment and the struggle over gun regulation proved to be far more complicated and contentious than I had imagined. Rather than fit into either a simple gun control or gun rights framework, the story of the struggle over this issue was filled with innumerable ironies and unexpected historical twists and turns. Partisans on both sides of this controversial issue are likely to find a number of surprises in these pages. Readers who come to this book with an open mind will be gratified to learn that the current impasse over guns in America was not inevitable.


I stumbled into this topic quite by accident. While completing a book on the Anti-Federalists, I noticed that a handful of writings by the opponents of the Constitution were frequently cited by scholars and partisans in the contemporary gun rights movement. Having spent more than a decade working on Anti-Federalism, I found it hard to reconcile the claims being made about Anti-Federalist ideas with what I knew about the opponents of the Constitution. It seemed particularly odd to me that scholars who claimed to be seeking the original understanding of the Second Amendment would lavish so much attention on the losing side's thoughts in the original struggle over the Constitution. Even if one acknowledges that the Anti-Federalists were the other founders of the American constitutional tradition, it seems curious that their thinking should be accorded as much, if not more, authority than the Federalist Founders. I decided that I needed to write a short article on this subject and expected to quickly move on to another project on Thomas Jefferson and the Enlightenment. As I dug deeper into sources, however, I realized that not only was the individual rights model of the Second Amendment trumpeted by gun rights advocates deeply flawed, but that the rival collective rights model also seemed difficult to reconcile with many of the sources I encountered. As I struggled to make sense of the evidence, I began to think that a new paradigm was needed to explain the understanding of the right to bear arms dominant in the eighteenth century. What emerged from these efforts was a pluralist model that acknowledged that there were a number of different views of the right to bear arms in the Founding era. The dominant model fit neither the modern individual nor collective rights models, but seemed more civic in character. It is important to recall that the Second Amendment was drafted and ratified by a generation of Americans who feared standing armies and had witnessed a systematic policy to disarm their militias. With these concerns in mind, America's first constitutions explicitly protected the right of citizens to keep and bear those arms necessary to meet their militia obligation. Having discovered that the individual and collective rights models were minority views in the Founding era, I set out to discover when these two interpretations rose to prominence in American law. Although I found some scattered evidence for both of these theories during the Founding era, it became clear to me that both of these models gained a strong hold on American legal thinking only in the decades after the adoption of the Second Amendment.


Tracing the evolution of American thinking about the meaning of the right to bear arms in all its complexity required looking in places that previous scholars had ignored. I realized that I would need to unite the top-down perspective of traditional constitutional history with the bottom-up perspective of social and cultural history. In my story the perspective of the backcountry farmers who took up arms during Shays's Rebellion would have to be accorded the same respect as the learned disquisitions of Supreme Court justices. Having resolved to look beyond the traditional types of sources used by legal and constitutional historians, I discovered hundreds of new sources never before consulted by scholars interested in this topic.


It is impossible to write or talk about this topic without being asked where you stand on the gun issue today. I am always amazed when people ask me if I am pro-Second Amendment or anti-Second Amendment. It is hard to imagine anyone asking a scholar with a particular view of freedom of the press or federalism if he or she is pro-First Amendment or pro-Tenth Amendment. Although I am strongly in favor of gun regulation, I do not consider myself anti-gun. Growing up in Brooklyn I did not have that much experience with firearms. Most of the shooting I did was at arcades in Coney Island. Like so many young boys in America, I was fascinated by guns and played with every conceivable type of toy gun, including a collapsible AR-7 rifle with infrared scope that fit snugly in my James Bond attache case. As a teenager I even acquired my own BB gun (illegally purchased), during a vacation in the Catskills. Although I had great fun with the gun in upstate New York, once I got back to Brooklyn I realized that there was not much one could do safely with a gun in a crowded Brooklyn apartment building. Guns are deeply embedded in American culture and history, and one must respect that fact if one wishes to understand the complex history of gun regulation and gun rights. Since beginning my research on this topic I have tried to learn more about firearms and their hold on the American imagination. I owe a great debt to Captain Scott Dawson, USMC, for taking me down to the Ohio State firing range and teaching me something of the power and allure of guns. Sadly, learning that I was a left-eye dominant and right-handed shooter probably dashed the last remaining James Bond fantasies left over from my childhood. I think I now understand why most colonial militia statutes exempted college faculty from reporting to muster. My brother-in-law Bill Hill also took me out shooting on his farm and helped me understand the important role that firearms continue to play for those who live in rural areas of the country.


The research for this book fills an entire six-drawer lateral file cabinet, and it would have been impossible to undertake a project of this scope and complexity without generous financial support. Funding for this project was provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Gilder Lehrman Institute. Much of the research for this book was done in conjunction with my work as director of the Second Amendment Research Center at the John Glenn Institute of Public Service and Public Policy Generous funding for the center was provided by grants from the Joyce Foundation. Roseanna Ander, program officer at Joyce, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the center's work and of my scholarship. I would also like to thank Ellen S. Alberding, the president of the Joyce Foundation, for recognizing the need for high-quality historical research on the role of guns in American law and society. The staff of the John Glenn Institute provided a congenial home to work on this project. Particular thanks are due Larry Libby Deborah Jones Merritt, Don Stenta, Deanna Stewart, Senator John Glenn, and Annie Glenn. Invaluable research assistance was provided by a number of graduate students at Ohio State University and elsewhere: David


Bernstein, Nathan Dedino, David Dzurec, Amber Esplin, Steve Garabedian, Nathan Kozuskanich, John Maass, and Joe Stewart-Pirone.


Several colleagues in the history department at Ohio State read the manuscript and provided thoughtful suggestions, including Michael Les Benedict, John Brooke, and Geoffrey Parker. Randy Roth shared with me evidence drawn from his own forthcoming study on the history of violence in America. My thinking about the historical issues relevant to this project has benefited from the comments and insights of a number of scholars: Robert Churchill, Jan Dizard, Carole Emberton, Paul Finkelman, Robert M Goldman, Leslie Goldstein, James Henretta, Don Higginbotham, David Konig, Peter Onuf, Jack Rakove, Lois Schwoerer, Robert Shalhope, and Lou Falkner Williams.


In the age in which the Second Amendment was drafted most lawyers obtained their legal education by pouring over classic texts such as Blackstone's Commentaries and serving long apprenticeships. Although I have never attended law school formally, I have spent hours reading Blackstone and other eighteenth-century legal texts. I have also sought counsel from a number of legal scholars on the fine points of constitutional law and interpretation, and particular thanks are due to them: Akhil Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky Michael Kent Curtis, Michael Dorf, Bernard Harcourt, Kurt Lash, Sandy Levinson, James Lindgren, Frank Michelman, Bryan Wildenthal, David Williams, and Adam Winkler. I owe a particular debt to Dean Larry Kramer of Stanford Law School for his support and guidance on many issues of constitutional law and interpretation.


A number of the ideas developed in chapters 5 and 6 were refined in papers presented at conferences at Fordham Law School and Stanford Law School. I would like to thank James Fleming and Martin Flaherty of Fordham and Bob Weisberg of Stanford for their help in Organizing these two events and for advice on a multitude of issues. Dave Douglas kindly invited me to present my research on St. George Tucker at William and Mary Law School. Kenneth Katkin of Northern Kentucky Law School hosted a lively conference on the Second Amendment, during which several ideas in the book were formulated. Kate Desbarats, Jim Rice, and the members of the St. Lawrence Early American Seminar offered thoughtful suggestions about chapter 4. Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg generously invited me to give the Settle-Cadenhead Memorial Lecture at the University of Tulsa. I profited enormously from their generosity and thoughtful suggestions. A talk on the changing iconography of the armed citizen in American history at Georgetown yielded a host of insights, and I am indebted to Michael Kazin for this opportunity. Jack Censer's invitation to give the Finlay Lecture at George Mason University provided another excellent venue to try out the ideas in this book.


Given the prominence of the Second Amendment in recent legal scholarship I was extremely fortunate to have had the opportunity to present drafts of nearly every chapter in the book manuscript at a series of faculty workshops at some of the nation s premier law schools. I would like to thank the following scholars for providing me with opportunities to try out earlier versions of my argument: Stuart Banner, University of California, Los Angeles; Jim Chen, University of Minnesota; Howard Erlanger, University of Wisconsin, Madison; Gerald Leonard, Boston University; Daniel Polsby, George Mason Law School; Chris Tomlins, American Bar Foundation/Northwestern University. I owe a special debt to Bill Nelson of New York University School of Law, who hosted me for two weeks and whose wonderful legal history seminar read an earlier draft of the. entire manuscript and offered innumerable suggestions.


Although this manuscript deals with a host of important issues in American constitutional and legal history-—-including the right of revolution, popular constitutionalism, the evolution of the common law, federalism, the scope of the early American police power-—-it would be extremely naive to think that readers will not be curious about the connection between this history and the modern struggle over gun regulation. These issues are dealt with explicitly in the conclusion, which attempts to offer some suggestions about how an appreciation for history can raise the level of public discourse on this issue. In thinking about the contemporary resonances of my work I have benefited from lively exchanges with scholars and activists on both sides of this issue. Among the scholarly proponents of robust gun regulation who have generously shared their knowledge of this topic with me I would like to thank Carl Bogus, Phil Cook, John Donhue, David Hemenway Jens Ludwig, and Robert Spitzer. Proponents of gun rights have also generously shared their point of view with me, including Randy Barnett, Bob Cottrol, Jim Jacobs, Abigail Kohn, Nelson Lund, Joyce Lee Malcolm, and Eugene Volokh.


The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence invited me to participate in a forum at the National Press Club on the subject "Guns and the Second Amendment." I benefited from my discussions with several lawyers at the Brady campaign: Dennis Henigan, Jon Lowy Tony Orza, and Brian Seibel. Mat Nosanchuk, formerly of the Violence Policy Center (VPC), and Kristin Rand and Josh Sugerman, also of the VPC, took time out of their busy schedules to chat with me about the current state of the debate on this issue. Sue Ann Schiff of Legal Community against Violence was a great source of information about contemporary litigation in this area. An invitation from the Students for the Second Amendment and the National Rifle Association s Institute for Legislative Action to participate in a Second Amendment symposium provided me with another wonderful opportunity to discuss the meaning of this provision of the Bill of Rights. A number of the leading gun rights lawyers in the nation attended that event. In particular I would like to acknowledge David Kopel, Stephen Halbrook, Richard Gardner, Don Kates, and David Hardy for sharing their passionate interest in this issue with me.


Shaping this manuscript into a book that could appeal to an audience beyond the academy required the efforts of many fine editorial pens. Heather Miller and Lauren Osborne gave earlier drafts of the manuscript a close and thoughtful reading. Charlie Finlay up-and-coming novelist, read the manuscript and offered excellent stylistic advice.


Michele Bove and Lelia Mander at Oxford University Press guided the manuscript through the production process. My brilliant and charming editor at Oxford University Press, Dedi Felman, read so many drafts of this manuscript that I feared this book on the Second Amendment may have violated Dedfs Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The unbridled enthusiasm for this project emanating from Niko Pfund, the academic publisher at Oxford University Press, was also a great source of inspiration.


My wife, Susan, and my daughters, Emma and Julia, endured too many hours with me at the computer screen. I appreciate their patience with a project that always seemed to take just a little bit longer to complete than I had hoped. I have dedicated this book to Emma and Julia. I hope that when they start their families someday this issue will no longer be so divisive and America will no longer be plagued by the problem of gun violence. Perhaps with a better sense of the - history of this issue Americans can create the kind of society in which schools will no longer need metal detectors in their doorways.




Introduction


A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and hear arms, shall not he infringed.


Second Amendment, U.S. Constitution



Whipping the crowd into a frenzy at the National Rifle Association annual convention, Charlton Heston, the group's charismatic president, raised an antique rifle above his head and challenged gun control proponents to pry his weapon from his "cold, dead hands." This defiant gesture, repeated on numerous occasions by the chisel-jawed actor known for his portrayals of key figures in history, has become a powerful symbol in America's bitter debate over the right to bear arms. To dramatize his rebellious stance, Heston did not wave a modern assault rifle, but a Revolutionary-era rifle, an iconic symbol that adorns pro-gun Web sites, tee shirts, and bumper stickers.


History is at the very heart of the rancorous debate over guns in America, and no issue is more controversial than the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Partisans of gun rights argue that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, recreation, and, if necessary, to take up arms against their government. Gun control advocates also claim to have history on their side and maintain with equal vigor that the Second Amendment simply protects a collective right of the states. Both sides have the history wrong.1


The original understanding of the Second Amendment was neither an individual right of self-defense nor a collective right of the states, but rather a civic right that guaranteed that citizens would be able to keep and bear those arms needed to meet their legal obligation to participate in a well-regulated militia. Nothing better captured this constitutional ideal than the minuteman. Citizens had a legal obligation to outfit themselves with a musket at their own expense and were expected to turn out at a minute's notice to defend their community, state, and eventually their nation. The minuteman ideal was far less individualistic than most gun rights people assume, and far more martial in spirit than most gun control advocates realize.2


Although each side in the modern debate claims to be faithful to the historical Second Amendment, a restoration of its original meaning, re-creating the world of the minuteman, would be a nightmare that neither side would welcome. It would certainly involve more intrusive gun regulation, not less. Proponents of gun rights would not relish the idea of mandatory gun registration, nor would they be eager to welcome government officials into their homes to inspect privately owned weapons, as they did in Revolutionary days. Gun control advocates might blanch at the notion that all Americans would be required to receive firearms training and would certainly look askance at the idea of requiring all able-bodied citizens to purchase their own military-style assault weapons. Yet if the civic right to bear arms of the Founding were reintroduced, this is exactly what citizens would be obligated to do. A restoration of the original understanding of the Second Amendment would require all these measures and much more.3


Most Americans no longer live in the small rural communities that nurtured the minuteman ideal. Regulation in modern America is typically seen as antithetical to rights. The opposite was the case for the colonists, who believed that liberty without regulation was anarchy. Without government regulation there would have been no minutemen to muster on the town greens at Lexington and Concord. The state's coercive authority over citizens could be significant. Failure to appear properly armed at a muster resulted in stiff penalties, and government kept close tabs on the weapons citizens owned to meet this vital public obligation. Although ardent in their love of freedom, Americans feared anarchy as much as they dreaded tyranny. An armed body of citizens unregulated by law was a mob, not a militia. The golden mean between the two extremes of anarchy and tyranny was the idea of well-regulated liberty, and nothing better captured this ideal than the militia.4


The militia statutes each colony enacted tell only part of the story of how this vital institution was enmeshed in the everyday lives of most colonists. If history taught Americans any lesson, it was that a standing army of professional soldiers presented a perpetual threat to freedom. A well-regulated militia was the only form of defense compatible with liberty. Only when the role of citizen and soldier were united could freedom be preserved. The militia not only protected Americans from external threats such as hostile Indians and rival European powers, but in an era before organized police forces it also provided the only means to protect communities from civil unrest. Before the rise of modern political parties, militia units provided an essential means for organizing citizens for political action. Muster days were important festive occasions that drew citizens together for celebration and revelry.5


The Americans who enshrined the right to bear arms in the first state constitutions were haunted by a fear of disarmament, but this fear "was quite different than the fears of gun confiscation that cloud contemporary debates over firearms. The Concord minutemen who fired the shots heard round the world had been mustered on that fateful day to prevent British regular troops from confiscating the militia's powder and arms. The first statements of the right to bear arms in American constitutional law were clearly aimed at protecting the militia against the danger of being disarmed by the government, not at protecting individual citizens' right of personal self-defense.


Although most eighteenth-century Americans did not fear that the individual right of self-defense might be threatened, this fear did eventually take hold decades after Americans wrote their first constitutions. In the early nineteenth century some Americans did come to believe this right was under assault. The threat these Americans felt did not come from a despotic monarch or an omnipotent Parliament, but from their own state legislatures. A profound shift in the character of firearms regulation occurred in the early decades of the nineteenth century In response to widespread fears that handguns and bowie knives posed a serious threat to social stability, legislatures enacted the first comprehensive laws prohibiting handguns and other concealed weapons. Then, as now, the enactment of gun control laws prompted a backlash that led to an intensified commitment to gun rights. One of the many embarrassing truths about the debate over the right to bear arms that neither side wishes to admit is that gun rights ideology is the illegitimate and spurned child of gun control. These early efforts at gun control spawned the first legal challenges to these types of laws premised on the idea of a constitutional right to bear arms for individual self-defense. While most courts upheld gun control laws and continued to assert a civic conception of the right to bear arms, a few courts embraced the new ideology of gun rights. One of the principal confusions in the modern debate over gun regulation, the blurring of the distinction between the constitutional right to bear arms for public defense and the individual right to bear a gun in self-defense, crystallized in the Jacksonian era. Public debate over gun control has stumbled over this issue ever since.6


If the debate over the right to bear arms had remained simply a matter of state constitutional law, then the story would be quite straightforward: the growth of an individual rights view and its ongoing struggle against the original civic vision of arms bearing. The only problem with this story is that it tells us nothing about the Second Amendment, which emerged out of the divisive struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the new Constitution. To understand this history one must deal with the way that this right became embroiled in the bitter debate over federalism. No issue in early American constitutional law was more contentious than the battle between proponents of states' rights and supporters of national power. While the language of the provision on arms bearing that Congress drafted, which eventually became the Second Amendment, was closer in spirit to the civic model embodied in the first state constitutions, Anti-Federalists and their Jeffersonian heirs came to interpret the Second Amendment within an evolving theory of states' rights. The right to bear arms in a well-regulated militia controlled by the states would provide the ultimate check on federal power if such power ran amok. The original Anti-Federalist understanding of the Second Amendment was revolutionary, assigning to the state militias the awesome power to resist federal authority by force of arms.7


The modern gun control movement's embrace of the collective rights theory of the Second Amendment is laden with irony. Contemporary gun control theory rests on a strong commitment to a powerful federal regulatory state. Few partisans of this theory realize that its constitutional roots may be found in a radical states' rights ideology that advanced a revolutionary .challenge to federal power. Of course the version of states' rights that lies at the heart of modern gun control ideology only faintly resembles its radical ancestor. To understand how states' rights theory was drained of its revolutionary potential we must examine the pivotal role that the Civil War and Reconstruction played in transforming the meaning of the Second Amendment. The foundation for the modern collective rights theory was forged in the carnage of the Reconstruction era.


The evolution of modern Second Amendment theory is closely bound up with the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment. Republican framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to give the federal government the power to incorporate the fundamental liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. According to incorporation theory, Congress and the courts would be given the authority to guard basic liberties, including the right to bear arms. Democrats argued against incorporation and claimed that the Second Amendment was a right of the states, not a right of citizens. In the Democrats' narrow states' rights theory the amendment did no more than restrain Congress from disarming the state militias. Ultimately, the courts rejected the Republican theory of incorporation and embraced the Democratic states' rights theory of the Second Amendment.8


The transformation of this late nineteenth-century states' rights theory into the modern collective rights theory was accomplished early in the twentieth century as judges, lawyers, and reformers grappled with the new problems posed by organized crime and gun violence. If the Second Amendment was merely a right of the states designed to prevent federal disarmament of the state militias, then, gun control proponents claimed, it posed no barrier to state or federal gun control laws. One additional change in American law and society facilitated the final transformation of the Second Amendment into a collective right: Congress replaced the Founding era's universal militia with the modern National Guard. Ordinary citizens could no longer make a claim to keep and bear private arms to meet their public obligation to participate in the militia. The connection between arms bearing and civic participation had been effectively severed. Only the participants in legally sanctioned military organizations could now make Second Amendment claims.9


Neither of the two modern theories that have defined public debate over the right to bear arms is faithful to the original understanding of this provision of the Bill of Rights. Previous scholarship oh this history has been warped by the ideological needs of the modern debate over gun control. Only by casting aside the ideology of gun rights and gun control can one discern the real and previously hidden history of the great American gun debate. While no scholar writing about this contentious issue can claim to be completely above the fray or entirely neutral, it is possible to approach this issue in a rigorous and balanced manner, focusing on the hopes and fears that drove earlier generations of Americans to venerate the right to bear arms and not confusing these debates with the modern conflict over gun control.


One need not deny gun rights advocates and gun control proponents their history. While each side attacks the other for being a recent invention, the truth is that both sides have a rich history that has much to teach anyone interested in the role of guns in American society. While these opposing theories have deep roots in American history there is little evidence that either theory was part of the original civic understanding that guided the framers of America's first constitutions. The individual rights and collective rights theories were products of later struggles in American history. Individual rights theory was born in the Jacksonian era as a response to America's first efforts at gun control. Collective rights theory emerged slowly at the end of Reconstruction and only crystallized in its modern form in the early twentieth century. The one theory absent from current debate over the Second Amendment is the original civic interpretation. The virtual extinction of this conception was not inevitable but was a product of a long and complex history. Although the story of the decline of the civic conception of the right to bear arms has never been told, this history is vital to understanding our current predicament over guns in American society.


The tangled history of the struggle to define the right to bear arms ought to serve as a cautionary warning to both sides in this debate. If history seems to provide clear and unambiguous support for one's ideological preferences in the great American gun debate, then the history is likely wrong. While history may not help us chart a clear path toward a solution to America's bitter conflict over the role of guns in American society, some appreciation for how we have arrived at our current deadlock is an important first step to moving forward in this debate.10

………………..


TO  BE  CONTINUED

Wednesday, June 1, 2022

WHERE HAVE ALL THE PROPHETS GONE?

 WHERE HAVE ALL THE PROPHETS GONE???

December 31st 2013



SO  WE  COME  TO  THE  END  OF  A  ROMAN  CATHOLIC  CALENDAR  -  THE  END  OF  2013.


YES  FIRST  IT  IS  NOT  A  NATURAL  WAY  TO  MOVE  FROM  ONE  YEAR  TO  THE  NEXT.  BUT  THAT  WAS  JUST  ONE  OF  THE  MANY  THINGS  THE  ROMAN  CATHOLIC  CHURCH  ADOPTED  TO  BRING  IN  NEW  CONVERTS,  THEY  COULD  STILL  KEEP  AND  OBSERVE  THEIR  OLD  PAGAN  CUSTOMS.


AND  SO  TOMORROW,  OR  AT  MIDNIGHT  [ANOTHER  ROMAN  CLOCK  ADOPTION] WE  MOVE  INTO  2014  ON  THE  ROMAN  CALENDAR.


THE  MOTHER  BABYLON  CHURCH  WAS  FORETOLD  IN  THE  BOOK  OF  REVELATION  TO  MAKE  ALL  NATIONS  DRUNK  ON  THE  WINE  OF  HER  SPIRITUAL  FORNICATION.  AND  SO  MOST  OF  THE  WORLD  NOW  KEEPS  AND  OBSERVES  JANUARY  THE  1ST  AS  THE  NEW  YEAR.  YOU'LL  SEE  IT  ON  TV  AS  IT  MARCHES  ACROSS  THE  PLANET.


NOW  GOING  BACK  3  OR  4  YEARS  I  ASK:


WHERE  HAVE  ALL  THE  PROPHETS  GONE??


FROM  ABOUT  2009  I  PERSONALLY  SAW  MANY  SO-CALLED  "PROPHETS"  SPEAKING,  WRITING,  ON  TV  OR  BOOKS  OR  ARTICLES,  THAT  2010  WOULD  BRING  IN  THE   LAST  YEARS  OF  THIS  AGE;  THAT  2011  OR  2012,  WOULD  SEE  THE  LAST  YEARS,  THE  "RAPTURE"  OF  THE  CHURCH  TO  HEAVEN;  THE  START  OF  THE  LAST  GREAT  TRIBULATION,  AND  ETC.


I  WAS  SAYING  THEY  WERE  ALL  VERY  WRONG!!


THOSE  PROPHETS  WERE  SPEAKING  FROM  THEIR  OWN  MIND,  WITH  WRONG  FIGURING  SOME  ANCIENT  DATE,  ADDING  TO  THIS  OR  THAT  OTHER  DATE,  THEN  DOING  SOME  MORE  JUGGLING  TO  BRING  TO  A  DATE  IN  THE  LAST  3  OR  4  YEARS.  OF  COURSE  THE  "SECRET  RAPTURE"  TEACHERS....WELL  FOR  THEM  CHRIST  CAN  COME  AT  ANY  SECOND.  THAT  SECOND  WAS  NOT  IN  THE  LAST  3  OR  4  YEARS,  AS  THEY  HOPED.


WELL  THERE  WAS  ALL  KINDS  OF  PROPHETS  SAYING  WE  SHOULD  NOT  BE  WHERE  WE  ARE  TODAY. 


FRANKLY  THEY  HAD  AND  HAVE  NO  CLUE  ABOUT  BIBLE  PROPHECY.


EXPECT  THOSE  PROPHETS  TO  GO  AT  IT  AGAIN  DURING  2014.  THEY  WILL  GO  BACK  TO  'DATES'  'YEARS'  -  ANCIENT  AND  NEW,  AND  THEY  WILL  COME  WITH  2015,  2016,  2018,  AND  AGAIN  THEY  WILL  BE  WRONG!!


I  KNOW  THE  SIGNS  TO  WATCH  FOR.  IT'S  ALL  EXPLAINED  IN  DETAIL  ON  MY  WEBSITE, BLOG, YOUTUBE.


AND  AS  I'VE  PUT  ON  MY  FRONT  PAGE,  KNOWING  BIBLE  PROPHECY  AND  MY  WALKING  WITH  GOD,  I  CAN  WITH  FULL  CONFIDENCE, TELL YOU,   JESUS  WILL  NOT  RETURN  BEFORE  2020.  NOW  THAT  IS  FOR  CERTAIN;  AND  THERE IS  A  VERY  GOOD  CHANCE  THE  END  TIME  GREAT  TRIBULATION,  WILL  NOT  COME  BEFORE  2020.  ONE  CERTAIN  SIGN  FROM  DANIEL  11:40-45  IS  NO  WHERE  CLOSE  TO  FORMING  AS  YET.  AND  UNTIL  THE  "KING  OF  THE  SOUTH"  COMES  ON THE  SCENE  WITH  EGYPT  AS  ITS  SPEAR-HEAD,  END  TIME  PROPHECY  WILL  NOT  TAKE  PLACE.

..........


Keith Hunt (December 31st 2013)